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The task of describing patterns of contemporaneous conceptual regionalization1 in Europe 
according to economic factors is at once seemingly easy and extremely difficult. It is seemingly 
easy due to clear institutional divisions within the economic sphere for most of the period under 
consideration (the twentieth century), which most of the time quite neatly divide different 
European countries into different groups. At the same time, it is difficult due to the fact that how 
contemporary people conceptualize the division among European regions according to economic 
factors is next to impossible to trace beyond a few academic publications, which reflect the 
public’s attitudes only to a limited extent. It is very tempting, but would be methodologically 
indefensible, to try to use noneconomic divisions, even though they are clear and 
contemporaneous, as a basis for the story. A prime example of such a division at present is the 
Schengen area. It is a clear regional concept, but it is not economic, even if some economic 
consequences do occur. It is a regionalization based on border security considerations, and there 
is not even a single economic criterion among the many criteria for membership in this area. 
Thus it cannot serve to define contemporaneous conceptual regionalization in Europe according 
to economic factors. 
 The problem of determining how the economic regions of Europe were framed becomes 
even more acute the further back in time one goes, due to the fact that economic considerations 
seem not to have had a separate importance, and regionalization evolved mostly along other 
lines, such as political, ethnic, linguistic, religious, or cultural. At the same time, further back in 
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history the clear institutional compartmentalization of the twentieth century was not present. The 
more subjective, or academic, exercises are usually affected by at least three factors. The first is 
the authors’ own inherited opinions as to the important determinants of regionalization. The 
second is the chosen methodology for discovering and determining the borders and the intrinsic 
qualities of the different regions—an exercise in which improvisation, intuition, and metaphors 
seemingly always supersede qualitative rigor, and in which even the possibility of such rigor can 
reasonably be questioned. And, third, more often than not such regionalizations are not strictly 
contemporaneous, but follow economic realities with a significant lag. 
 The more objective, or institutional, divisions of Europe into regions suffer mostly from 
two different objections. First, while they are to a large extent really objective, coming from the 
outside, they are not aiming at discovering economic realities, but mostly at serving the purposes 
of the “outsider”—such as, for example, the League of Nations, or the United Nations with its 
specialized bodies, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as more 
recently the European Union (EU), despite its very peculiar position as both supranational body 
and also “insider.” 
 When trying to describe the contemporaneous economic regionalizations of Europe, it is 
impossible to select one of the two approaches based on rigorous reasoning. A natural outcome 
of this recognition is the choice of describing and following both as much as possible while 
keeping in mind their deficiencies. As will become clear, in reality this has a bearing on the 
structure of the chapter due to the fact that the academic studies focusing specifically on 
economic realities are relatively recent and feature mostly in the discussion of the last quarter of 
a century, while further back in time the institutional divisions were prevalent. 
 Another methodological issue is the starting point of perceived European economic 
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regionalization. Usually, a convenient starting point is a specific large and important event or 
some sort of cataclysm that can serve as a visible break both in economic structure and in 
perceptions. But this approach must bear in mind that there is a certain inertia in economic 
perceptions, and they do not necessarily change quickly due to a specific event. Nevertheless, 
such an approach comes nearest to the possibility of having a clear and defensible starting point, 
and therefore it is the approach taken here. 
 Along these lines, the starting point of this analysis is the end of World War I. It is 
chosen for two main reasons. First, it is a clear breaking point, coming after a relatively long 
period of dominance of the Great Powers regime, which formed after the Vienna Congress and 
evolved only slowly into a status quo with several empires and some peripheries. This relatively 
clear structure obviously had a bearing on economic regionalization as well. World War I 
shattered this status quo and gave birth to the supranational organization, the League of Nations, 
which covered a significant part of the continent, and, besides its political role, had a very 
specific economic role to fulfill. The other regionalization was also clearly institutionally 
distinguished in the communist experiment. 
 Therefore, at the end of World War I there is a clear break with the old status quo, and the 
emergence of an institutional framework allowing for the observation of contemporaneous 
patterns of regionalization. From then on, institutional developments on the European continent 
allow for a relatively coherent story about the different European regions within the institutional 
framework, shaped to a large extent by the parallel development of the United Nations with its 
bodies, the European Economic Community, and the socialist bloc. 
 The end of this period in 1989 brought another reshaping of the institutional framework 
on the continent, but also coincided with the almost explosive emergence of a number of 
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academic studies on regionalization and its prospects on the continent. While not unrelated to 
one specific institutional development, namely the EU’s regional policies, this academic 
development presents a parallel and relatively independent view on European economic regions, 
which allows us to delve into a more informed analysis and attempt some more generalized 
inferences. 
 
The Age of Empires 
World War I marked the end of an era in the development of the European continent, and this 
was the era of the Great Powers. Even though the century preceding the war was marked by 
important developments, revolutions, experimentation with forms of government and 
constitutional setups, and also by the emergence of the last two great nation-states on the 
continent (Italy and Germany), the institutional structure was relatively clear and functioning. It 
was the age of European (colonial) empires, and the clear establishment and observance of most 
of the relevant borders meant a relatively clear division of economic space as well. Seemingly 
unruly regions, such as the Iberian and Balkan peninsulas, were also gradually incorporated into 
this international order. During this period most of the relevant cleavages, including economic 
ones, naturally fell around the imperial borders. 
 At least in the trade and monetary area, however, there were deliberate attempts to create 
supranational structures, some of which were relatively successful. Three such examples can be 
given. The most successful effort in this respect, ultimately leading to the integration of the 
different participating parts into a single state, was the Deutsche Zollverein, or the customs union 
of the German lands, which began in the 1820s and expanded to include most of the German 
states. Coupled with the operation of the gold standard and standardization of coinage and of 
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weights and measures, this deliberate economic integration really did create a common economic 
space. 
 There are at least two other attempts at supranational structures in the monetary area, both 
based on the gold standard: the Latin and the Scandinavian monetary unions. The Latin monetary 
union was created in the 1860s on the initiative of France, incorporating Switzerland, Italy, and 
Belgium. It extended to the two troublesome peninsulas mentioned above—the Iberian Peninsula 
(Spain) and the Balkans—with the membership of Greece and later association of Serbia, 
Romania, and Bulgaria. Using standardized coinage and free acceptance of the different 
currencies, it operated relatively successfully for a number of years, coming to an end only with 
the tensions of World War I, which de facto ended it; de jure dissipation came in 1927. 
 The Scandinavian monetary union, inspired to some extent by the developments in 
Germany and the Latin countries, was established in 1873 over the northern portion of the 
European continent and was a relative novelty in that even banknotes were interchangeable and 
accepted across borders. Though it had overcome various tensions, this monetary union was also 
brought to an end by World War I, with the de jure dissipation coming in 1924. 
 These examples show that World War I was a true cataclysm, economic as well as 
political and military, in that it brought about a change in established or emerging economic 
structures throughout the continent. The age of empires was effectively over, and other factors 
came into play in delimiting the economic regions in Europe. 
 In terms of deliberate scholarly reflection on the issue of economic regionalization in 
Europe during this period, the economic literature does not offer much material. This is probably 
because economics as a discipline was itself only emerging during the nineteenth century, and 
even at the end of the imperial period its very methods as a science were under contention, 
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culminating in the well-known Methodenstreit between the Austrian and the historical schools of 
economics. 
 It is relatively easy to identify definite spatial overtones in the initial literature on 
economics. Adam Smith’s (1776, book 1, part 3) concept of the “extent of the market” has a 
direct territorial and spatial meaning. The same is true of Malthus’s (1826) idea about the link 
between economic prosperity and population, including population density relative to 
agricultural resources. Ricardo’s (1821) concept of comparative advantage can immediately be 
translated into regionalization based on resource availability and geographical characteristics. 
However, all these ideas did not secure concrete implementation for specifying economic 
regions and could only serve as starting points toward such a classification. On a theoretical 
level, both the insights of the Scottish Enlightenment and later developments by Ricardo and 
Malthus do contain the seeds of a potential theory of regional development, but such a theory 
was never actually formulated. On an empirical level, there do exist comparisons—for example, 
between England and the Netherlands, France, or Spain—but they are more national than 
regional in character and pertain to illustrating theoretical concepts different from the ones that 
might lead to a theory of economic regionalization. 
 Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the major thrust of economic science followed 
the example of the natural sciences and developed theories and inferences based on universal and 
generally valid principles, deliberately ignoring differences based on context and specific 
environments. Only the German historical school was interested in context. The thinking of some 
of its representatives, such as Schmoller (1900-1904) and Wagner (1902), has definite spatial 
and regional overtones, and much of the enormous amount of concrete data gathered by them 
could potentially lead to a definition of explicitly regional aspects of economic development. 
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Also, even earlier the push toward the Zollverein indicated clear thinking on the part of 
precursors and early representatives of German historicism beyond political borders and toward a 
conceptualization of the idea of a common economic space. 
 Thus it is no surprise that the most significant concept leading to definite regionalization 
in Europe sprung precisely from the German historical school. It is found in Weber’s ([1905] 
1930) division based on aspects of religious beliefs, which basically split Europe into 
southern/Catholic and northern/Protestant regions with different economic development. Even 
though, from the point of view of identifying specific economic regions, the Catholic-
Protestant/southern-northern division based on Weber’s insight is still quite crude, it is 
nevertheless a valuable effort in creating a concept for the basis of differences between different 
modes of economic development on the continent. 
 
The Interwar Period 
In terms of economic regionalization, the period between the two world wars features relatively 
clear institutional structure and is dominated by two related processes, which are both political 
and economic. The first is the emergence of a new structure and subsequent recovery after World 
War I, and the second is the positioning leading to World War II. In terms of the first process, the 
economic structure in interwar Europe can be described mostly by the outcome of the war itself, 
and the European continent can be split in four. This split is loosely based on the divisions 
implicit in the activity of the Economic and Financial Organization of the League of Nations 
(Clavin and Wessels 2005). 
 A central, stable place in this structure is held by the countries which won the war, mostly 
the UK and France, which seem to be the ones setting the agenda and looking for solutions not 
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only on the economic issues, but more generally. They can be seen as the order-providing core, 
even though it is a matter of careful consideration whether they were successful in managing this 
task. One opposite party to this core was devastated Germany, coupled with debilitating punitive 
debt obligations imposed by the victors. The country was not allowed to become a member of 
the League of Nations and was de facto turned into an outsider, left to cope alone in an 
unfriendly environment (until 1926, when it was finally accepted). Another opposite pole to the 
leading core was communist Russia, and later the Soviet Union. This was a territory in the far 
eastern part of the continent, which was effectively torn from whatever level of economic 
integration into the overall European economy it had achieved. Like Germany, it did not become 
a member of the League of Nations and was not involved in its economic activities. This 
economic space took off on a completely separate economic trajectory, a fact clearly recognized 
by all contemporaries (see, e.g., Webb and Webb 1935). 
 Besides the two large nonmembers of the League of Nations, who by this very 
institutional setup formed a separate economic space, there were the countries in Eastern Europe, 
many of which had newly emerged after the war (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary), or 
greatly expanded in the wake of the war relative to the period of the Empires (Romania, 
Yugoslavia, Greece, and to a lesser extent Bulgaria). Most of these countries faced severe 
economic difficulties and were in a position to need economic assistance, which was provided 
through the institutional setup of the League of Nations. 
 The second part of the interwar period was marked by two interrelated developments: the 
Great Depression and the repositioning on the continent, both political and economic, which 
ultimately led to another world war. The Great Depression, quite like the Great Recession eighty 
years later, hit the core as well as Germany hard. Its effect on the Soviet dynamics was less 
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obvious, except that it made the Soviet model of economic organization look even more 
intriguing and attractive. Its effect on the periphery in Central and Southeastern Europe was 
mostly a consequence of their own internal weaknesses, rather than of transfer of the Depression 
dynamics. 
 The latter part of the 1930s saw a clear division of Europe into three parts, which were 
also visibly separated economically. Western Europe, with its (relative) market democracies 
continued to have a specific and separate economic dynamic. (East) Central Europe became 
dominated by dictatorships or dictatorial regimes, and also became economically dominated by 
Germany, which served as a major economic attractor. This tendency of the time is explicitly 
evident in the “Lebensraum” concept, in the resurfacing of the “Drang nach Osten” (Spread to 
the East) slogan around the Sudeten crisis,2 and the specialized trade and economic agreements 
between Germany and East-European economies such as Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. 
Finally, the Soviet Union, with its five-year plans, continued on its own trajectory, clearly noted 
and distinguished by many contemporary observers both empirically (Webb and Webb 1935) 
and theoretically as exemplified in the socialist calculation debate (e.g., Lange 1936 and 1937). 
 This clear separation and lack of economic integration should be considered among the 
leading factors that made the second severe armed conflict within a human generation in Europe 
possible. The very observation of the relevance of such an economic factor, then, should be 
considered as a major impetus for the formation of a new political, but also economic, order in 
Europe after World War II. 
 During the armed conflict of 1939–45, a vision for the development of a specific 
European economic vision was drafted and put into practice. This was the implementation of the 
Generalplan Ost of Nazi Germany (Madajczyk 1990, Mueller 1991), aimed at Eastern Europe, 
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and especially at Ukraine. Being essentially a plan for economic colonization of the territory of 
Eastern Europe, it necessarily included a certain vision for the economic purpose of this space. In 
general, this purpose was seen in terms of specialization in raw materials provision and in 
agricultural output serving the needs of the more highly developed industrial heartland of the 
Third Reich. 
 Thus, even though it is relevant only to a part of Europe, namely portions of Central and 
Eastern Europe, the Generalplan Ost essentially combines two distinct principles of economic 
regionalization, which will continue to emerge throughout the present study. The first is division 
along certain geographical lines, in this case West and East. The second is division based on 
specialization, in this case an industrialized, developed, high-value-added core, or center, and a 
less developed hinterland or periphery with low-value-added primary outputs (raw materials, 
foodstuffs). 
 
The Iron Curtain Period 
Institutional factors continued to dominate the economic divisions within Europe in the wake of 
World War II. However, in the Western part of the continent, the division clearly became more 
complex, involving different levels of economic groupings and decisions. At the same time, the 
West-East divide, which emerged along ideological lines after World War I, moved from the 
relative periphery of the continent to its very center in the form of the Iron Curtain, which 
included not only political and military juxtaposition, but also a strong economic split. As a 
structural consequence, there was very little room for a relative periphery between the two 
camps, or blocs. 
 In the East, a clearly defined and easily observed economic bloc emerged as a result of 
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the establishment of communist dictatorships. After their political settling, these dictatorships 
introduced economic changes based on the communist ideology, involving specific organization 
of economic life. Several years later, in the mid-1950s, the next step was taken and a 
supranational economic organization, the Comecon (formally Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance, or CMEA) was formed. For the next three decades, this part of Europe became a 
distinct and clearly defined separate economic region, based on state-owned property, full-scale 
economic planning, and Soviet Union–dominated international division of labor and trade. 
 In terms of regionalization, the Comecon can simultaneously be seen as creating divisions 
among and homogenizing the different European members of the Eastern bloc. The divisions 
mainly involved different members of the bloc specializing in different specific industries 
(products) with a somewhat limited intra-industry division of labor. The homogenization came 
from the fact that all countries were expected to develop both raw materials, agriculture, and 
lighter and heavier industries, so that none could be seen as subordinate to others in the 
economic chain of value added. Despite this second thrust of the Comecon, it is clear that in 
terms of planning, coordination, decision making, and conflict resolution there was a definite 
center—the USSR—and a clearly defined periphery: the other socialist countries. 
 This Eastern, or socialist, bloc was characterized by relatively strong trade integration, 
internal transfers based on centrally made decisions about the prices at which goods were to be 
traded and the division of labor between various participating states, and the clear leading role of 
the dominating Soviet Union. However, it did not include all countries embracing socialism—for 
example, Yugoslavia and Albania remained a less integrated periphery. In the case of 
Yugoslavia, the country established relatively strong ties with the Western part of the continent. 
 In the West, initially at least, three different processes developed simultaneously, 
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overlaying each other, and having different effects in terms of economic integration, linking, and 
ultimately regionalization. The first such process was the Marshall Plan (formally the European 
Recovery Program). It involved aid (capital transfers) from the USA to all European countries 
desiring to participate, which ultimately included all of what would be termed Western Europe 
(but including Greece and Turkey), except for Spain and Finland. The rejection of the proposed 
1947 plan by the Soviet Union and its satellites was a clear, institutionalized indication of the 
economic split of the European continent. Regardless of how the concrete effects of the plan are 
viewed and assessed, its very existence and unfolding in the specific context of the time 
indicated the major economic divide that was to dominate the European continent for the next 
four decades. 
 The second process in Western Europe was integration within the framework of 
international cooperation and joint decision making realized through the United Nations 
Organization (UNO). In terms of the economic importance of this development, the relevant 
structures were the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), and the UNO-
parented international financial organizations known as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. Both were established to provide assistance for development and financial 
stability to member states. The formation of Western Europe as a region is most evident in the 
lists of memberships of countries in these bodies. 
 The strongest impetus for regionalization in Western Europe, however, came through the 
process of deliberate European integration known today as the European Union. Its very 
beginning (in the form of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic 
Energy Community) was strictly driven by economic considerations, and especially by the desire 
to render further armed conflicts between European states less likely through close economic ties 
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and interdependence. The institutional framework of the European Union through time provided 
a clear trajectory for the development of different economic regions on the continent from the 
time of its creation in the early 1950s. It also allowed the formation of various groupings within 
the Union itself, due to its capacity to develop different processes within the same general 
framework. 
 Initially, the specific integrational effort by the six founding members (France, German 
Federal Republic, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) clearly set them apart with 
respect to the other Western European countries and established an easily identifiable European 
economic region defined by free trade, first in specific resources, but with the target of a general 
free trade zone and eventually a common market. 
 After the evident initial success of the arrangement, it started attracting the interest of 
other European countries, especially the UK, which until then had always formed a somewhat 
separate entity in any European regionalization. This resulted in the first expansion of the 
European Union to include the UK, Ireland, and Denmark, increasing this specific economic 
region of Europe and greatly expanding its potential. From then on, the EU has been a major 
attractor and structuring force for the Western (and later the whole) European economic space. 
However loose (at least at the beginning), its institutional character demonstrates a high level of 
self-identified regionalization of the continental economic space. Its expansion has led to specific 
developments in this sphere as well, by gradually forming distinct “camps” within the Union. 
 This process began clearly with the second expansion of the Union in the 1980s, when 
within the space of several years a clearly recognized southern periphery was admitted in the 
form of Greece, Spain, and Portugal. A major legitimizing factor in this second expansion was 
the concept of economic convergence. More specifically, one of the postulates of neoclassical 
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economics, namely the understanding of diminishing marginal returns to capital and therefore 
the inevitable—within a common economic space—catching-up of less capitalized countries 
with more capitalized countries in terms of real income per capita, clearly served as a strong 
argument in favor of expansion. The economic reality was that this development led to the 
introduction of significant economic disparities within the Union (which before that had mostly 
been confined to the contrast between Southern Italy, and in part Ireland, and the rest of the 
Union) on a relatively massive scale that was impossible to ignore. Economic convergence, even 
when it really happens, takes time, while the disparities immediately turn into political reality. 
 There were two results of this change. First, already in the 1980s there were calls within 
the union to institutionalize the fact of the differences in level of economic development and 
integration so that more developed and less developed and integrated parts of the union had their 
own paths. This concept gradually became known as the idea for Multispeed Europe. Second, 
and in opposition to the idea of separate development paths within the union, came the first 
conscious attempts to introduce convergence, or cohesion, policies, with the side effect of a 
strengthened interest in the regional dimensions of the European economic landscape and 
development. 
 
From Transition to Eastern Enlargement 
In 1989 two processes relevant to the dynamics of perceived economic regionalization in Europe 
came to a critical point. The first was the competition between the two big blocs, ideologically 
and institutionally divided straight down the middle of the continent. After going through a series 
of convulsions during the late 1970s and the 1980s, the socialist bloc collapsed, while at the 
same time Western Europe demonstrated a relatively good growth capacity and improved 
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standards of living. The second process was related to internal EU developments and had an 
academic character, namely the development of spatial models of regional economic 
development, which led to a series of metaphorical formalizations of perceived regions within 
the Western European, and later broadly European, economy. 
 At the same time, within the EU the increased variety of member states and continued 
institutional innovation led to specific internal divisions, once again (after the nineteenth 
century) centered on the issue of monetary union. In any case, besides the institutional changes 
in Eastern Europe due to the collapse of the planned economies, the institutional changes within 
the EU continued to provide a rich institutional basis for changes in economic regionalization, 
despite the emergence of different, more academic and visionary, perceptions of existing regions. 
 The collapse of communism and the planned economies of the Soviet bloc, coupled with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union itself, was the beginning of another major institutional 
turbulence in the eastern part of the European continent. The definition of this region can be 
clearly traced by following the activities of various international financial institutions, with none 
more clear than the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Created for 
the sole purpose of providing support for countries in transition from planned to market 
economies, it had a very specific area of focus, initially covering the European members of the 
socialist bloc, and later the separate countries resulting from the split of the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Geographically, the area recognized in this manner as 
“Transition Europe” spans the territory from Central Europe to Central Asia as far as Mongolia. 
 The main publication of the EBRD, the series under the title “Transition Report,” clearly 
identified three separate economic regions, differentiated by the bank’s set of “transition 
indicators,” within this vast space: the CEB (Central Europe and the Baltics), the SEE (South-
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Eastern Europe), and CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States, the ex-Soviet Union). In terms 
of relatively successful self-identification, four of the CEB countries, namely Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, identified themselves early on as the Visegrad Four and 
embarked on a process of relatively quick integration into the European Union. 
 In fact, the splitting of Transition Europe in three by the EBRD turned out to anticipate 
subsequent events quite correctly. The group identified as transition leaders (the CEB) were the 
ones who managed within fifteen years of the change in 1989 to become members of the EU. 
The middle group (the SEE) were considered as doubtful about integrating into Europe, and it 
has turned out that some of these countries are now members (Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia) while others are still far from membership. The third group (the CIS) has very poor 
prospects for EU integration and is still undergoing economic, as well as political, transition and 
turbulence. 
 The center of gravity defining these movements in Transition Europe, it becomes clear, is 
the European Union. Ultimately, it is around this center that the Eastern European countries are 
ordered—from relatively deeply integrated (CEB), to relatively poorly integrated (Bulgaria, 
Romania), to nonintegrated (part of the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe), to actively opposing 
(Russia, Belarus). In effect, the change during these years has been that a select number of 
Eastern European countries have managed to transform themselves from the relatively richer 
Western part of the Soviet bloc to the relatively poorer, but integrating, part of the European 
Union. 
 Thus the EU has become the defining general framework within which and in relation to 
which economic regions in Europe are perceived and are actually formed. It seems that its 
internal developments and dynamics will continue to be the defining factor for the actual and the 
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perceived regionalization of Europe for some time to come. Probably the most encompassing 
metaphor describing the presence of a variety of different levels, directions, and tempos of 
development on the continent is the image of Multispeed Europe, which can be applied in 
different degrees to all concrete examples of conceptual regionalizations given below. 
 
Blue Banana and Beyond: New Models of Economic Regionalization 
The process of conceptualizing the developmental and integrational challenges facing the 
European Union after it accepted countries in the 1980s that, in economic terms, clearly 
belonged to a periphery led to the emergence of specific regional policies and to the formulation 
of explicit notions about how the European economic space is structured in terms of identifiable 
regions. Within the period 1989–2002 at least six such metaphors emerged, each having at least 
some idiosyncratic specifics. 
 It was in 1989 that Roger Brunet (1989) developed an image of a core of the European 
economy along a curved discontinuous corridor, later termed “The Blue Banana” due to its shape 
on the map. Covering the economic area from Northwest England to Northwest Italy, the area 
exhibits relatively high levels of real income per capita, seems to concentrate very high levels of 
economic activity, and seems to be an attractor for other areas. Later interpretations developed 
this idea, expanding it to include some of the areas along the Mediterranean (down to 
Northeastern Spain) and indicating specific potential directions for expansion of this formation 
(Hospers 2003, Figure 1). This included three specific peripheries to the core: Western (Ireland, 
Western France, and the Iberian Peninsula), Northern (Scotland and Scandinavia), and Eastern 
(from Central Europe down to Southern Italy). 
 This metaphorical image was the first to grab public attention and people’s imaginations, 
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and was to serve as the basis of further similar exercises, some of which will be mentioned 
below. However, it is based on a relatively rigorous application of specific spatial concepts and 
ordering according to a set of economic indicators, and it holds useful information beyond the 
mere image. The question, as is the case with all other representations here of the European 
economic space, is the extent to which it reflects generally held perceptions about 
regionalization, and also the extent to which such representations influence such perceptions in 
the general public or in other academic circles. 
 Interestingly, the image of the Blue Banana carries a certain resemblance to much older 
economic patterns in Europe, in particular the reemergence of long-distance trade and the 
formation of relatively independent cities after the Dark Ages, especially related to the transfer 
of goods through the Alps northward using the Rhine. This economic core was later reinforced 
both during the blossoming of ocean trade routes in the early modern period and once again 
during the industrial revolution. It is actually quite natural for this area to continue to be an 
economic core some two centuries later. 
 Only a year after the Blue Banana, Lutzky (1990, summarized in English in Nijkamp 
1993, 11 and Figure 5, and also noted in Metaxas and Tzavdaridou 2013, 16–17 and Figure 2) 
significantly expanded on the idea, incorporating notions of the international division of labor 
based on certain geographical and natural economic advantages. The result is an image of 
Europe of the Seven Apartments, each with its own specific features. In this image, Apartment 2 
corresponds quite clearly to the Blue Banana and is named “Technology Network West.” The 
other six apartments are, to an extent, of special interest, mostly because they also seem to 
reproduce relatively traditional, even ancient, perceived divisions. Apartment 1, for example, 
called “The Sun Belt” and spanning Greece, Italy, the Mediterranean islands, and the Iberian 
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Peninsula—that is, roughly from Istanbul to Lisbon—is seen as an agrarian and recreational 
space, also providing labor force for the Banana. Its geography literally overlaps with the ancient 
Hellenistic and Roman economic space. Apartment 3, named “North-Sea Partners,” encompasses 
the North Sea and its neighbors from Scotland through Eastern England to the northern parts of 
the lowlands (today the Netherlands and Belgium), Denmark, and Norway. It is seen as 
specializing in working the resources of the North Sea, including food and energy, and providing 
harbors and shipbuilding services. Apartment 4, named quite directly “Baltic Hanse,” is another 
clear reference to an economic region of older times. Like the North Sea region, it is envisaged 
in this regionalization as providing sea-related services, some raw materials (especially timber), 
and trade routes for channeling other resources to the core. 
 The other three apartments comprise the regions of the old Soviet bloc, newly emerged 
from decades of planned economy. They quite closely coincide with the implicit division, 
mentioned above, of this same vast region by the EBRD, and the three apartments are almost 
exactly the same as the three groups from the Transition Reports. The only difference is that 
Lutzky distinguishes them not according to progress along a set of transition indicators, but 
along spatial dimensions and lines of potential specialization under the envisaged common 
European division of labor. Thus Apartment 5 is the “Middle-European Capitals,” including the 
four Visegrad capitals, Berlin, and Vienna. It is envisaged as a very competitive extension of the 
Banana, specializing in administrative activities, research and development, heavy industry, and 
trade both as a transit and as internally generated flows. In this way, the vision of Lutzky, not 
unlike Brunet’s original idea, envisages an actual expansion of the Banana to the East. 
Apartment 6 corresponds to the CIS area from the Transition Reports, including mostly the ex-
Soviet republics, and is appropriately named “East-Slavic Federation.” Following another 
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traditional stereotype, which nevertheless seems to be confirmed by later economic data, this 
region is envisaged as a provider mostly of fuels, raw materials, and agricultural products. Given 
the low value-added of this specialization, it is expected to remain the poorest of the European 
apartments. Finally, Apartment 7 is quite optimistically named “Balkan Take-Off,” expected to 
develop toward providing light industry products, foods, and transportation services. It was also 
expected to be among the poorer regions due to its specialization. The expected take-off has not 
materialized yet, but in defense of this vision it must be said that political factors and armed 
conflict may have played a more important role than the economic specifics underlying the 
particular vision of the Europe of Apartments. 
 Overall, this vision is among the clearest views of a regionalized Europe. The vision is 
based on both economic and spatial considerations and on historically established areas related to 
longer traditions. It clearly shows a desire to see Europe as a single economic space—a single 
home, with one roof, but with different and specialized rooms and with naturally occurring 
disparities. 
 Immediately after these two conceptualizations of European economic regional 
development, a third one emerged, forming somewhat of a trend in thinking. Kunzmann and 
Wegener (1991) presented the idea of Europe as a bunch of grapes, called “The Green Grape” in 
obvious reference to the Blue Banana imagery. In this metaphorical image, the regional 
development of Europe is presented both statically and dynamically. Its main concept is the idea 
that a large number of relatively clearly separable urban bubbles (areas centered in economic 
terms around a relatively large urban formation) are connected with different kinds of economic 
and infrastructural links. Thus some already form a cluster of such interconnected bubbles, and 
others will continue to form and join the cluster, which has in this manner an almost limitless 
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(geographical) capacity for expansion. 
 Kunzmann and Wegener’s image is both similar and different from the Blue Banana and 
Europe of the Apartments metaphors. It is similar in that the several core urban bubbles around 
which the cluster is forming are in fact the Blue Banana, only this time presented as a connected 
series of large and highly integrated urbanized areas. From this point of view, the Green Grape 
may be considered another extension of the idea that economic regions of Europe are defined 
and will be developing in their economic and geographic relation to this core. However, 
Kunzmann and Wegener’s bunch of grapes can also be interpreted as a much more horizontal 
and less hierarchical ordering of regions than Brunet’s idea of a single super-region (the 
Banana), or Lutzky’s idea of several regions that are all centered on and somehow defined by 
their relations with this same center. The idea of a bunch of grapes conveys the possibility of a 
relatively horizontal network of different urban areas and points toward much less hierarchy and 
a much more equal footing between the different grapes in the cluster. This image much more 
strongly conveys the idea of separate linkages, independent from a specific core, between 
different regions. 
 Another feature of the bunch of grapes idea is that its understanding of the regionalization 
of Europe is closer to the institutional view of the European Union and the then-emerging 
concept of a “Europe of regions.” The regions in both cases are considered to be subnational, not 
supranational. Even though not limited by national borders, they form (or coagulate) around 
certain urban centers and their size is visibly smaller than the size of the economies of the 
countries. Thus the overall image is that Europe’s economic regions will be many, small, and 
relatively horizontally connected in a complex network. 
 Several years after the first three emblematic metaphorical images of European economic 
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regionalization emerged in the academic literature, a new strong image appeared in Van der 
Meer (1998). Again, its basis can be traced to the Blue Banana concept of a core, but it offered a 
specific and different vision about the manner of growing interconnectedness and extending 
regionalization. When a map is drawn of these extensions from the core, the image looks like the 
spread tentacles of an octopus. 
 In short, the image indicates clear “corridors,” lines, or tentacles of spreading economic 
linkages, all of them stemming from the original Banana. This spread is envisaged as moving in 
all directions, except of course due north, where there is only sea. These directions include 
northeast toward Stockholm through Hamburg and Copenhagen; due east through Berlin to 
Warsaw and potentially to Moscow; southeast through Vienna, Budapest, and Belgrade into the 
Balkans; due south to Rome; southwest through Barcelona to Madrid and eventually Lisbon; due 
west through Paris (famously not in the original Banana), Nantes, and possible Bordeaux; and 
northwest toward the Edinburgh-Glasgow area. 
 Akin to the grape image, this visualization of Europe’s economic regionalization is based 
on economic linkages spreading along interconnected urbanized areas. Unlike the grape image, 
and closer to the apartments image, the different tentacles of the octopus do not seem to be 
connected with the other tentacles, only with the core. Thus the Red Octopus once again returns 
to the idea that the economic development regionalization of Europe will be based in, and related 
to, a specific core. 
 Even though developed at the end of this decade of proliferation of spatial images of 
European economic regional development, the last two metaphors in fact mostly return to the 
beginning, namely to the idea of a single dominating core. The image of the Pentagon is a return 
to this type of thinking, only the geometrical shape is different. Also known as the 20-40-50 
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Pentagon, this core region is spanned by five major cities: London, Paris, Milan, Munich, and 
Hamburg. According to rough estimates, which of course change with time, at the end of the 
twentieth century this region comprised about 20 percent of the area, 40 percent of the 
population, and 50 percent of the real income in the EU. 
 The image of the Pentagon became very popular in EU documents (European 
Commission 1999; 2004; 2007a; 2007b), and was used to indicate convergence between 
European regions in the decade between 1995 and 2005. However, one of the problems of this 
metaphor is the lack of a concept about the relations and developments among the peripheries 
outside the core. 
 Finally, to return where it all started, in 2002 Brunet (as presented in English by Curci 
2011) presented a new image, showing virtually the same core of the European economy, but 
this time in the shape of a ring that is surrounded by concentric circles, indicating closer or more 
distant peripheries. The Ring is a relatively clear oval shape when the cities of London, Paris, 
Basel, Zurich, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Cologne, and the region of the Randstad (the four cities) in 
the Netherlands are connected. In the same publication, the idea is conveyed that the spatial 
distribution of economic development processes seems to be taking the shape of concentric ovals 
around this core. Ultimately it returns to the imagery of a core with periphery. 
 The review of academic conceptualizations of European economic regionalization offers 
several general inferences. First, the offered images generally constitute a conception along the 
lines of a core and its periphery, with the possible single exception of the Green Grape of 
Kunzmann and Wegener. Second, the ideas often replicate historically known regional 
developments and distinctions over the last two to three millennia. Third, thinking in the 
direction of conceptualizing the spatial characteristics of European economic development by the 
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imagination of academic researchers seems to have a relation, and may even be shaped by, the 
already emphasized institutional divisions offered within the framework of the European Union. 
 
The EU in Crisis 
The year 2007 signaled two simultaneous changes in Europe’s economy. The first was the 
completion of the fifth wave of enlargement of the European Union with the incorporation of 
Romania and Bulgaria, uniting most of the continent in a single economic space. The second was 
the coming of the Great Recession, which for the EU meant a severe financial crisis and also 
very significant pressure on the newly created monetary union. Both of these changes have led to 
a relative change in the dynamic of European economic regions. The regional dimension of these 
changes has not yet entered the academic literature, but is clearly visible in formal institutional 
changes at the EU level. For this reason, this part of the overview will return to focusing mostly 
on the changing regional perceptions as they can be inferred from the institutional changes. 
 The joining of a number of Eastern European countries to the EU created conditions for 
catching up and a gradual decrease in disparities between them and the more western European 
core. Besides the fact that macroeconomic data do indeed indicate such convergence, it is notable 
that, as of 2015, five of these countries managed to join the “inner” club—the monetary union 
within the economic union. At the very same time, the financial and economic crisis clearly 
demonstrated severe deficiencies in the economic structure of another area within the economic 
and monetary union, namely “the South.” It is notable that all Southern European countries 
(Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal) are experiencing a breakdown in their economic and welfare 
systems, and three out of the four had to obtain international financial and institutional support. 
 The result of all this is that a major shift took place in the focus of EU institutions, 
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especially the ones underlying the monetary union. The European semester, the fiscal compact, 
and the banking union, as well as the changes in the way monetary policy is conducted in the 
Euro area, are all a de facto recognition that the Southern European countries are no longer 
considered an integral part of an economic core, but rather a periphery in need of guidance and 
help. Coupled with the fact that despite difficulties the new EU members from Eastern Europe 
seem to be coping with the Great Recession without major breakdowns, this development means 
that the major regional economic cleavage is not between a Western core and an Eastern 
periphery, but rather between a Northern engine and Southern trouble. Once again, the idea of a 
Multispeed Europe is clearly on the academic and political table. 
 
Conclusion 
This brief overview of the conceptualization of European economic regions over the period of a 
century shows a significant dynamic, especially when traced through the way various 
supranational institutions seem to have viewed the continent. For most of the century, the major 
split has been between a Western core and a relatively poor and less clearly defined Eastern 
periphery. The idea of a core, spatially situated along the area most famously designated as the 
Blue Banana, seems to be attractive for most academic authors involved in such spatial analyses, 
and also seems to be accepted institutionally at the EU level through the reforms of the monetary 
union in the wake of the Great Recession. Ultimately, it may be that the presently existing 
tendency for Europe’s regionalization into different economic areas may be changing its most 
important axis from a West-East toward a North-South divide, but only time will tell whether 
this existing tendency will develop further. Several very recent developments, such as specific 
policies adopted in Eastern Europe as a result of recent elections (Hungary, Poland), as well as 
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the vote in the UK to leave the European Union, indicate that a much more complex dynamic 
may be taking place, and the resulting regionalization may follow axes and cleavages difficult to 
foresee at present. 
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Notes 
1. Contemporaneous here means that what is under consideration is the division of Europe into 
regions as perceived by those living in a particular historical period. It is different from ex-post 
regionalization—i.e., regionalization suggested and conceptualized by people living often 
significantly later than the respective historical period. 
2. Noticed by Carlson (1937) as being used without translation or explanation in American 
media at the time. 
                                                          
